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Abstract—The omnipresent digitalization trend has enabled a
number of related malicious activities, ranging from data theft to
disruption of businesses, counterfeiting of devices, and identity
fraud, among others. Hence, it is essential to implement security
schemes and to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of
electronic circuits. Toward this end, the concept of physically
unclonable functions (PUFs) has been established at the beginning
of the 21st century. However, most PUFs have eventually, at
least partially, fallen short of their promises, which are unpre-
dictability, unclonability, uniqueness, reproducibility, and tamper
resilience. That is because most PUFs directly utilize the underly-
ing microelectronics, but that intrinsic randomness can be limited
and may thus be predicted, especially by machine learning.
Optical PUFs, in contrast, are still considered as promising—they
can derive strong, hard-to-predict randomness independently
from microelectronics, by using some kind of “optical token.”
Here we propose a novel concept for plasmonics-enhanced optical
PUFs, or peo-PUFs in short. For the first time, we leverage
two highly nonlinear phenomena in conjunction by construction:
(i) light propagation in a silicon disk resonator, and (ii) surface
plasmons arising from nanoparticles arranged randomly on top
of the resonator. We elaborate on the physical phenomena,
provide simulation results, and conduct a security analysis of peo-
PUFs for secure key generation and authentication. This study
highlights the good potential of peo-PUFs, and our future work
is to focus on fabrication and characterization of such PUFs.
Index Terms—Hardware Security, Physically Unclonable Func-
tion, Plasmonics, Optical Waveguide, Silicon Disc Resonator
I. INTRODUCTION
FOR many decades now, authentication and other securityschemes have leveraged the randomized manifestations of
selected physical, biological, or other phenomena. For exam-
ple, biometric identification is based on the unique patterns of
fingerprints, retinas, voices, or even walking pace and motion.
For electronic circuits, the notion of physically unclonable
functions (PUFs) has been established at the beginning of the
21st century [1]–[4]. When applied some input stimulus, a
PUF should provide a randomized, fully de-correlated output
response. This response should be reproducible for the very
same PUF, even under varying environmental conditions, but it
should differ across different PUF instances, even for the same
PUF design. PUFs are used for (i) challenge-response-based
security schemes, which require capabilities for processing a
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large number of inputs (using so-called “strong PUFs”) or
(ii) for “fingerprinting” or simple key generation schemes,
which require capabilities for processing only one or few fixed
inputs (using so-called “weak PUFs”) [2]–[4].
In short, the desired properties for a PUF are uniqueness,
unclonability, unpredictability, reproducibility, and tamper re-
silience, while possible applications are device authentication,
secure generation of keys, and device-entangled cryptography.
The core principle for electronic PUFs is to leverage the
process variations inherent to microelectronic fabrication and
to boost these variations purposefully using some dedicated
circuitry. Prominent types of electronic PUFs are ring oscilla-
tors, arbiters, bistable rings, and memory-based PUFs [2]–[5].
Such PUFs are relatively simple to implement and integrate,
even for advanced processing nodes. However, it is also
important to note that all these PUFs rely on the intrinsic
randomness of the underlying microelectronics. This random-
ness can be limited and may be eventually predicted/cloned.
In fact, various attacks have been demonstrated, with machine
learning emerging as the most powerful approach [4]–[7].
Another interesting option are optical PUFs [1], [2], [8]–
[10]. Here the idea is to manufacture an “optical token” which,
in addition to structural variations inherently present in se-
lected optical media, may contain randomly included materials
(e.g., microscopic particles). Besides such a token, optical
PUFs require further components, for generating the optical
input and processing the output. The fundamental phenomena
underlying an optical PUF are scattering, reflection, coupling,
and absorption of light within the optical token. Depending
on the materials used for the token and the inclusions, as
well as the design of the token itself, these phenomena can be
highly chaotic by nature [10], [11]. Hence, optical PUFs are in
principle more powerful than other types of PUFs. Still, prior
art on optical PUFs has some practical limitations, e.g., the use
of linear media, external and exposed optical tokens, the need
for complex and sensitive setups, or the need to customize
manufacturing steps for different PUF tokens.1
Aside from optical PUFs, we note that particles of different
type and size have been used for some time for “tagging”
and optical authentication of goods [12], [13]. In fact, the
first well-known approach for secure authentication of goods
was particle-based tagging of nuclear weapons during the cold
war [12]. Different materials can be leveraged for particle-
based tagging, e.g., quantum dots, fluorescent particles, or
metallic nanoparticles (NPs). The latter are particularly inter-
1See also Section II for a more detailed review of prior art.
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esting, as they effectively boost the light-matter interaction.
Indeed, the concept of plasmonic NPs has gained significant
traction recently for security schemes [13]–[17]. As with
most optical PUFs, however, current schemes require external
components; integrated schemes have not been proposed yet.
Given that plasmonic NPs can induce highly nonlinear
behavior [11], [16]—which is extremely valuable when de-
signing a PUF [5]—it is surprising that none of the prior
works did consider such NPs for an advanced optical PUF.
This paper can be summarized as follows:
• For the first time concerning PUFs, we propose to entan-
gle two promising, highly nonlinear physical phenomena
by construction: light propagation in a silicon disk res-
onator, and surface plasmons arising from NPs arranged
randomly on top of the resonator. We name this con-
cept as peo-PUFs, short for plasmonics-enhanced optical
PUFs (physically unclonable functions). The concept is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
• We discuss and study the underlying physical phenomena,
the latter by means of Lumerical FDTD and COMSOL
simulations. Using the same tools, we obtain different
data sets for various peo-PUFs under different conditions.
• Based on these data sets, we evaluate the randomness,
uniqueness, and reproducibility of peo-PUFs, confirming
their applicability for secure key generation in principle.
We also propose a simple authentication scheme, based
on the secure keys and some related helper data.
• The concept can be directly integrated into any silicon
device, thus it can provide better resilience than prior ex-
ternal PUFs. The manufacturing of silicon disc resonators
is a well-known process, and plasmonic NPs can be easily
deposited on top of a resonator in a random fashion,
e.g., by sputtering. We believe that these two aspects are
essential for successful adoption of peo-PUFs.
II. PRIOR ART FOR OPTICAL PUFS
We like to point out that the very first PUF proposal was
actually an optical PUF; in 2002, Pappu et al. [1] made an
optical token from transparent epoxy with randomly inserted,
micrometer-sized glass spheres. That token was illuminated by
an external laser, whereupon the resulting speckle pattern was
visually recorded, filtered, and digitized. In 2013, Rührmair
et al. [8] first replicated and confirmed the findings by Pappu
et al. and then prototyped an integrated optical PUF based
on the same working principle. Tuyls et al. [9] discussed
integrated optical PUFs in 2017, albeit only in theory, with-
out any experimental evaluation. Also in 2017, Grubel et
al. [10] demonstrated an resonator-based PUF with pseudo-
randomized structures. To the best of our knowledge, their
work was the first to demonstrate a nonlinear optical PUF.
While these works are promising, there are also some
notable limitations. As for the early external optical PUFs [1],
[8], their setups are relatively complex. Thus, these PUFs are
not only sensitive to environmental parameters like variations
of temperature and supply voltages, which is the case for any
type of PUF, but also to mechanical vibrations, laser align-
ment, etc. Besides, exposing the token can result in wear and
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Fig. 1. Our concept for peo-PUFs. At its heart is an device-integrated,
micrometer-sized silicon disk resonator with plasmonic NPs of different
shapes, sizes, and metals, randomly arranged on top of the resonator. Consid-
ering recent advances for optoelectronics, the peripheral components may be
at least partially integrated onto the electronic device as well.
tear; an external PUF may become irreproducible after some
time. Even more concerning, an external PUF can arguably
never be trusted completely—an attacker can take hold of
the token and, subsequently, (a) re-use it for authenticating
of counterfeit chips, or (b) explore its challenge-response
behavior for modeling attacks. As for the early integrated
optical PUFs [8], [9], their shortcoming is the limitation to
linear materials which can be modeled/cloned [8]. The recently
proposed PUF [10], while certainly an advancement over
the other prior art, has still limitations. For one, it requires
sophisticated, external optoelectronic components, e.g., pulse
pattern generators and programmable spectral filters. More-
over, this PUF relies on pseudo-randomized structures within
the resonator which requires customizing the manufacturing
steps for different PUFs, which seems impractical.
III. DISCUSSION AND STUDY OF THE PHENOMENA
A. Light Propagation in Silicon Resonators
It is well-known that silicon is transparent to infrared light
and has a very high refractive index. The accordingly strong
photonic confinement allows for the design of micrometer-
scale, yet efficient, silicon-made optical waveguides [18].
Among others, prominent applications are optoelectronic fil-
ters based on silicon disc resonators (SDRs), i.e., circular
cavities which enable strong light interaction. That is, light
entering an SDR builds up in intensity over multiple round-
trips within the cavity, where only particular wavelengths,
depending on the SDR design, will be in resonance.
The light propagation within SDRs in particular and sil-
icon devices in general are subject to various nonlinear ef-
fects. These include the Kerr effect, Raman scattering, self-
modulation, two-photon absorption, et cetera [10], [11], [18],
[19]. The nonlinearity in silicon is fundamental for light-to-
light interaction, which itself is essential for techniques such as
wavelength conversion. Depending on the SDR design, other
chaotic effects like dynamic billiards can also play a role [10].
B. Plasmonics
Because of the outstanding capability for sub-wavelength
confinement of electromagnetic energy, plasmonics has be-
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Permittivities of metals used in plasmonics, with their (a) real
and (b) imaginary parts. The two TiN on SiO2 data sets are for different
depositioning conditions. For J&Ch and McPeak data, see [31].
come a driving force for progress in the area of nanopho-
tonics [20]–[22]. Metallic nanostructures are at the heart of
plasmonics—the phenomenon of plasmonics originates from
strong coupling of photon energy with free electrons in
a metal. This strong coupling supports a wave of charge-
density fluctuations along the surface of the metal, thereby
creating a sub-wavelength oscillating mode called a surface
plasmon [11], [23], [24]. More specifically, for one, there is
the electromagnetic energy transport for the propagation of
surface plasmon polaritons (SPPs) sustained at the planar
metal/dielectric interface; for another, there is the localized
surface plasmon resonance (LSPR), a non-propagating ex-
citation of the metal’s conduction electrons coupled to the
electromagnetic field. Note that the LSPR in particular is
under intensive research for many years now [11], [16], [25]–
[28]; that interest is also because a large variety of metallic
nanostructures are commercially available, which all give rise
to unique properties and applications.
The LSPR field enhancement is dictated by various factors.
First and foremost, the enhancement depends on the metal
properties [27]. For example, Fig. 2 illustrates the permit-
tivities of commonly considered metals, all exhibiting highly
wavelength-dependent properties. Moreover, the field enhance-
ment also depends on the NP structure and size [25], [26],
[29], [30], the coupling arrangement or direction [27], and the
materials surrounding the NP [15]. See Fig. 3 for simulations
with differently sized and arranged NPs; the simulation setup
is described in Section V-A.
Besides LSPR field enhancement, when light interacts with
a NP, the light can be absorbed and/or scattered. Those pro-
cesses arise in resonant conditions, i.e., where the absorption
efficiency is the highest. The extinction efficiency, that is the
sum of absorption and scattering efficiencies, can be engi-
neered via the size, shape, and dielectric environment of the
E
k
(e) (f )
(c) (d)
(a) (b)
E
k
Fig. 3. Simulations for plasmonic field enhancement. (a)–(d): Excitations by
single gold NPs of different sizes. (e), (f): Excitations by two gold NPs (same
size) which are (e) not coupled versus (f) coupled. The latter shows a strong
non-resonant gap mode. Vectors E are for the electric field and k for the light
propagation, respectively.
metallic NPs (Fig. 4; see below for details). For NPs smaller
than the wavelength of excitation, note that the efficiency of
absorption dominates over scattering. For NPs that have one
or more dimensions approaching the excitation wavelength,
the optical phase can vary across the structure. Thus, the
retardation effect should be accounted for. Such nanostructures
can also be considered as SPP waveguides that propagate back
and forth between the metal terminations, thereby creating a
Fabry-Perot resonator for SPPs.
The extinction efficiencies illustrated in Fig. 4 were obtained
via COMSOL FEM simulations. The electric field of light is
polarized along the side of the NPs, i.e., for the transverse
electric mode propagating in the SDR. For such an arrange-
ment, the dipole or higher-order plasmonic modes of the NPs
are excited; for small NPs, only the dipole mode is supported.
As the NP radius increases, the higher-order modes appear,
which shift the resonant conditions to longer wavelengths (see
curve peaks). At the same time, higher-order modes can also
appear at shorter wavelengths (e.g., Fig. 4(a), for NP radius
135nm). The extinction efficiency and resonance conditions
depend not only on the NP size but also the material properties;
recall Fig. 2. The shape of the extinction-efficiency curve
depends mostly on the resonance conditions of an NP. For
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Extinction efficiencies for (a) gold and (b) titanium nitride NPs of
different sizes, but uniform height/thickness (30nm and 20nm, respectively).
NPs are labelled as “disk” in the plots.
gold NPs (Fig. 4(a)), the extinction efficiency is narrow, with
the maximum located at the wavelength of 640nm, for an NP
with radius of 60nm. In contrast, the extinction efficiency for
titanium-nitride NPs (Fig. 4(b)) is much broader and shifted
toward longer wavelengths, with the maximum located at the
wavelength of 1300nm, for an NP with radius of 100nm.
Other non-resonant effects are to be considered as well.
Most important, for two or more NPs that are close to each
other, the longitudinal field component of the SPP can “jump
inside the gap” such that the field is particularly enhanced
within the gap (Fig. 3(f)). The enhancement magnitude de-
pends on the size of the NPs and the spacing between them:
the smaller the gap, the higher the enhancement. In case the
field component is parallel to or outside of the gap, each of the
NPs excites its “own” mode which are not coupled (Fig. 3(e)).
IV. TOWARD PLASMONICS-ENHANCED OPTICAL PUFS
A. Concept
Considering all these effects which we outlined above, it is
intuitive that metallic NPs on top of an SDR will significantly
impact its photonic mode propagation. This, in turn, will help
to induce highly nonlinear behavior for our envisioned PUF
concept. As outlined, the disturbances arise primarily through
absorption, scattering, and LSPR field enhancement, but with
all effects acting at once. Given that the SDR will be made
from silicon, a nonlinear material, the field enhancement can
also locally impact the SDR’s refractive index, thereby further
disturbing the mode propagation. As with plasmonic field
enhancement, this interference depends on the size of the NPs,
their coupling direction, light polarization, material properties,
et cetera [15].
In this work, for the first time, we entangle the two
nonlinear phenomena of silicon photonics and plasmonics. We
propose the concept of plasmonics-enhanced optical PUFs
(peo-PUFs). Besides the concept in general, we furthermore
propose to leverage peo-PUFs, for now, as so-called “weak
PUFs” for secure key generation and authentication. There are
two important aspects to note here.
1) “Weak PUFs” are not necessarily inferior to “strong”
PUFs [6]. On the contrary, powerful machine learning
attacks such as [4]–[7], [32] do not apply for weak PUFs,
only for strong PUFs. The main difference between
weak and strong PUFs is that the former work on a
(few) fixed input(s), or challenge(s), whereas the latter
have to support a large range of inputs/challenges.
2) Peo-PUFs may also be implemented as strong PUFs; the
SDR tokens by themselves can readily support a large
range of optical inputs. However, this would necessitate
more complex optoelectronics for the PUF devices.2
It is important to note that, as of now, our work is carried out
at the level of modelling, physical simulations, and analytical
security evaluation. For future work, we will focus on the
manufacturing and characterization of peo-PUFs as well as the
verification of security promises in manufactured peo-PUFs.
Next, we outline the design, working principle, and key
generation and authentication for peo-PUFs. The simulation
setup is given in Section V-A.
B. Optical Token and Optoelectronics
Recall that silicon disc resonators (SDRs for short) are at
the heart peo-PUFs, upon which plasmonic NPs of various
shapes, sizes, and metals are placed randomly (Fig. 1). The
manufacturing of silicon waveguides/resonators as well as the
depositioning of NPs are well-established processes. Unlike
most prior art for optical PUFs, peo-PUFs can, therefore,
take full advantage of commercial manufacturing facilities.
Moreover, the token can be irrevocably integrated on the
electronic device—we argue that this is essential for proper
implementation of security schemes.
We argue that advances for optoelectronics may allow us to
strive for monolithic integration sooner than later. For example,
IBM has recently demonstrated an ultra-fast photonic intra-
chip communication link [33]. In general, the monolithic inte-
gration of optical modulators and photodetectors is considered
mature, with research focus shifting toward the integration of
the light source/lasers [34]–[37]. Besides, hybrid integration
of plasmonics and silicon photonics has been demonstrated as
well, e.g., by Chen et al. [38].
As indicated, while peo-PUF tokens can support broad
ranges of optical inputs in principle, generating these inputs
would require, e.g., spectral encoding, frequency sweeping, or
power modulation. Therefore, the challenge here would be to
manage the complexity of the related optoelectronics, which
may render a monolithic integration of peo-PUFs ultimately
more difficult. Hence, in the remainder, we assume a simple
setup with a fixed laser input pulse for the peo-PUFs.
2 Besides, in anticipation of related security concerns, we would like to
stress that Atakhodjaev et al. [32] have recently shown that machine-learning
attacks on strong SDR-based PUF can be already challenging, due to the
inherent nonlinearity of silicon SDRs. As we motivate in this paper, once the
additional phenomena of plasmonics becomes intertwined, we can reasonably
expected even better resilience against such attacks.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Electric fields and photonic propagation for an SDR without NPs (a)
versus with one gold NP (b). The inset in (b) shows the propagation mode
for the NP. Dimensions in µm.
C. Working Principle
Once an optical pulse enters the SDR token, the nonlinear
phenomena of silicon photonics and plasmonics result in a
highly complex and chaotic, yet reproducible, optical output.
Figure 5 illustrates the electric field and the photonic
propagation mode for an SDR acting as peo-PUF token.
Parameters for the pulse are the same as in Fig. 3 and 6; see
also Section V-A. The SDR is 3.3µm in radius and 180nm
thick. Only for Fig. 5(b), a gold NP (20nm thick, 60nm
radius) is placed on top of the SDR (at x=-2µm and y=-2µm).
This arrangement allows to excite a dipole plasmonic mode,
illustrated as inset.
Figure 6 plots the pulse transmission for different arrange-
ments of single NPs on top of an SDR. For simplicity, and
also to show-case the inherent potential for highly nonlinear
behavior of peo-PUFs, both simulations consider (a) only one
single gold NP versus no NP,3 and (b) no manufacturing vari-
abilities, i.e., the SDR and the NP are assumed to be perfect
disks without any roughness, etc. Still, it is evident from
these simulations that already one perfect NP has a significant
impact on the propagation modes. In reality, manufacturing
variabilities and more NPs can further enhance the randomness
of peo-PUFs, thereby increasing their unpredictability.
Detrimental effects such as device aging, laser noise, or
temperature variations may play a role in practice, but this
can only be properly investigated once peo-PUFs are manu-
factured, which is scope for future work. In any case, error
correction scheme to mitigate environmental impact on PUFs
has been discussed in detail, e.g., in [3], [8], [39].
D. Key Generation and Authentication
After applying a fixed input pulse, the output is processed as
follows to obtain a key. First, wave shaping/spectral filtering
is applied to extract different partitions (or features) across the
whole wavelength spectrum of the optical response. Second,
analog-to-digital conversion is applied on each feature to
obtain the underlying bits. To enable a stable key, the noisy,
least significant bits are rejected across all features. Finally, for
each feature, their stable bits are bundled, and these bundles
are grouped. Without loss of generality, the above steps are
taken such that the key is 128 bits long. In general, the number
3See Fig. 10 for results concerning an arrangement of multiple NPs.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 6. Transmission plots for different peo-PUF tokens: (a, b) SDR token with
radius 6µm, (c, d) SDR token with radius 5µm. The SDR’s height/thickness
is 180nm for both setups. Both SDR tokens are independently simulated for
three variations of one gold NP, regarding the NP sizes/radius. Without loss
of generality, the considered NP radii are 60nm, 120nm, and 240nm. For fair
comparison, the NPs are always placed at the same location on the SDR.
of key bits dictates the number of bits to extract per feature
and the number of features to be considered. This, in turn,
dictates the requirements for accuracy and resolution of the
optoelectronics and the analog-to-digital circuitry.
For authentication of chips using integrated peo-PUFs, we
propose the following simple two-phase scheme, following
the literature [2]. During the initial enrollment phase, which
is to be conducted in a trusted environment, the unique
PUF responses are observed and different keys are derived.
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Besides the actual keys, some key parameters—also known
as helper data—are to be recorded as well. For peo-PUFs,
that is: (a) the selection of frequency features, and (b) the
number of considered bits for each feature. Note that this
helper data is essential to verify the keys. Furthermore, we
record the fractional Hamming distance (FHD) for the same
key obtained under different operating conditions. As for
the actual authentication phase, after enrollment, the PUFs
are to be queried again, using the same fixed input and a
selected configuration for the helper data, and the resulting
key is compared with the recorded one. The authentication is
considered successful in case the key falls within the FHD
expected for the operating conditions and helper data.
V. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
Simulations for the frequency and time domain are carried
out using the Lumerical FDTD software. All simulation data is
exported for the subsequent security evaluation. If not specified
otherwise, and without loss of generality, we assume a 5µm
radius and 180nm height for the SDR, a height of 30nm
for the NPs, an optical input pulse of 100fs duration, an
ambient temperature of 300K, and a simulation time-frame of
8ps. Note that each simulation took multiple days; more NPs,
longer simulation time-frames, etc., will significantly increase
runtime. For absorption and scattering phenomena (Fig. 4),
COMSOL FEM simulations were performed.
For the key-generation and authentication framework, we
use Matlab and custom scripts. The security evaluation is
based on entropy, NIST randomness tests [40], and FHD [2].
Without loss of generality, we leverage the frequency-domain
data obtained from Lumerical FDTD simulations for the se-
curity evaluation. We apply the post-processing steps outlined
in Section IV-D. We sample 1,000 different keys for each
peo-PUF configuration under consideration, by varying the
selection of frequency features and the number of bits per
feature. Note that we release our post-processing and security
evaluation framework to the community via [41].
We consider various peo-PUF setups, mainly for different
arrangements of NPs, but also for different SDR tokens
and operating conditions (temperature and pulse width). The
configurations are labeled and summarized in Table I.
B. Randomness
For peo-PUFs acting as weak PUFs, it is essential to
quantify the underlying randomness, which also reflects on
their unpredictability [2]. As indicated, we evaluate the entropy
and conduct NIST tests toward that end.
We report the entropy S for the different peo-PUF configu-
rations in Table II. All mean entropies are beyond 0.987, which
hints on strongly random distributions of zeroes and ones
across all keys and for different peo-PUFs. For the minimal
entropies, however, we note that Si5um and Si5umTiN60nm,
i.e., the peo-PUF without any NP and the peo-PUF with one
single titanium-nitride NP, respectively, appear the weakest.
Hence, the addition of plasmonic NPs can indeed help to
TABLE I
CONSIDERED PEO-PUF CONFIGURATIONS
Label Short Description
1) Si5umAu60nm(a) SDR radius 5µm, 1 gold NP radius 60nm
2) Si5umAu60nm(b) As Si5umAu60nm(a), but different location for NP
3) Si5umAu60nm(c) As Si5umAu60nm(a), but different location for NP
4) Si5umAu60nm(5) As Si5umAu60nm(a), but 5 gold NP
5) Si6umAu60nm SDR radius 6µm, 1 gold NP radius 60nm
6) Si5umAu120nm SDR radius 5µm, 1 gold NP radius 120nm
7) Si6umAu120nm SDR radius 6µm, 1 gold NP radius 120nm
8) Si5umAu240nm SDR radius 5µm, 1 gold NP radius 240nm
9) Si6umAu240nm SDR radius 6µm, 1 gold NP radius 240nm
10) Si5um SDR radius 5µm, no NP
11) Pulse100fs As Si5umAu60nm(a), but different location for NP
12) Pulse50fs As Pulse100fs, but input pulse width 50fs
13) Pulse200fs As Pulse100fs, but input pulse width 200fs
14) Temp300K As Si5umAu60nm(a), but different location for NP
15) Temp350K As Temp300K, but ambient temperature 350K
16) Si5umTiN60nm As Si5umAu60nm(a), but 1 titanium nitride NP
17) Si5umTiN60nm(5) As Si5umAu60nm(a), but 5 titanium nitride NP
18) Si5umTiN(5) As Si5umAu60nm(a), but 5 titanium nitride NP
with radius ranging from 60nm to 240nm
TABLE II
ENTROPY AND PASSING OF NIST TESTS
Min S Mean S F (% ) FB (%) R (%) AE (%)
Si5umAu60nm(a) 0.933 0.9911 83.8 98.1 99.8 98.9
Si5umAu60nm(b) 0.9625 0.9972 98.6 100 83.9 96.5
Si5umAu60nm(c) 0.928 0.9871 72.3 99.1 99.9 98.1
Si5umAu60nm(5) 0.9575 0.9968 98.2 99.4 99.8 99.3
Si6umAu60nm 0.9727 0.997 98.5 99.9 98.3 98.8
Si5umAu120nm 0.9579 0.9969 98.4 100 93.1 98
Si6umAu120nm 0.9597 0.9979 98.6 100 98.7 98.7
Si5umAu240nm 0.9682 0.9961 96.3 99.2 99.1 98.4
Si6umAu240nm 0.9523 0.9963 97 99.6 100 99.8
Si5um 0.9259 0.9926 88.1 99.4 99.9 98.5
Pulse100fs 0.964 0.9964 97.3 100 90.9 97.4
Pulse50fs 0.9681 0.9978 98.6 100 83.8 96.5
Pulse200fs 0.9696 0.9965 98.8 99.7 100 99.3
Temp300K 0.9632 0.996 97 99.8 97.7 97.5
Temp350K 0.9258 0.9905 81.7 99.7 100 98.8
Si5umTiN60nm 0.9183 0.9895 80.6 98.7 99.7 97.9
Si5umTiN60nm(5) 0.9398 0.9902 83.6 99.2 99.4 98.2
Si5umTiN(5) 0.9423 0.9911 89.9 98.8 99.8 98.5
increase randomness, but the degree of randomness depends
on the NP count, materials, etc.
We furthermore conduct the following, commonly consid-
ered NIST tests [40].
1) Frequency (F): testing for the proportion of zeros versus
ones across the entire key.
2) Frequency within a block (FB): testing for the proportion
of zeroes versus ones within m-bit blocks, for m = 20.
3) Runs (R): testing for the number of uninterrupted se-
quences (identical bits) across the entire key.
4) Approximate entropy (AE): testing for the frequency of
all possible m-bit patterns, with respect to an enumer-
ation of all possible overlapping blocks of consecutive
lengths (m and m+ 1), for m = 3.
The NIST tests are all based on p-values, i.e., they can quantify
the confidence for passing (or failing) particular test. More
specifically, the p-values represent the probability that a perfect
random number generator would have produced a sequence
less random than the sequence that was tested. In other words,
if the p-value for a particular test is equal to 1, then the
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key appears to be perfectly random concerning the kind of
randomness assessed by that test.
In Table II, we report the percentage of keys pass-
ing the NIST tests, all for a confidence interval of 99%.
We observe that the configurations Si5umAu60nm, Si5um,
Si5umAu60nm(c), and Si5umTiN60nm are inferior to others.
Hence, configurations with none or only one NP are limited.
Here we would like to caution that already the positioning of
single NPs may lead to these results. That is corroborated by
the fact that the configuration Si5umAu60nm(b) is superior,
although it also holds only one gold NP of same size and
shape as the other configurations. In reality, where we are
free from considerable simulation runtimes, peo-PUFs could
and should comprise many more NPs, all randomly arranged.
We believe that the arrangement of an individual NP would
play no significant, possibly deteriorating role there anymore
for the overall randomness.
C. Uniqueness and Reproducibility
Two further key properties for any PUF are uniqueness and
reproducibility [2]. Both uniqueness and reproducibility are
to be measured on pairs of PUF outputs resulting from the
same challenge. Uniqueness describes the difference of outputs
across two PUF instances, whereas reproducibility describes
the similarity of outputs for the same PUF instance, but under
different operating conditions. Therefore, reproducibility can
also be thought of as reliability. The FHD, short for fractional
Hamming distance, is used to quantify both properties.
Regarding FHD for uniqueness, also known as inter-FHD,
the ideal value is 50%; regarding FHD for reproducibility,
also known as intra-FHD, the ideal value is 0%. Since the
inter- and intra-FHD can vary depending on the applied
challenge/helper data, we report Gaussian FHD distributions
along with their histograms, mean values µ, and standard
deviations σ (as suggested in [2]). It is important to note that
deviations from ideal inter-/intra-FHD values are tolerable as
long as their distributions remain reasonably separated.
Next, we investigate peo-PUFs for two critical operation pa-
rameters, namely input pulse width and ambient temperature.
We contrast the FHD distribution for different pulse widths
in Fig. 7. That is, here we assume that the input may exhibit
some noise which peo-PUFs should be able to tolerate, at least
to some degree. More specifically, we consider the scenario
Pulse100fs versus Pulse50fs as tolerable fluctuations for one
and the same input challenge, i.e., concerning reproducibility
and intra-FHD. Another scenario, Pulse200fs versus Pulse50fs,
is considered as comparing two different peo-PUFs with
different laser setups, i.e., concerning uniqueness and inter-
FHD. Now, from Fig. 7, we note that the FHD distributions
for these two scenarios are clearly distinct. Hence, the peo-
PUFs are (a) reproducible for small input variations, around
50fs, and (b) unique for different laser setups.
The ambient temperature impacts the reproducibility of
most, if not all, types of PUFs [2]–[4]. In Fig. 8, we contrast
the intra-FHD for the same peo-PUF (with one gold NP)
at 300K versus 350K ambient temperature, after applying
correlation-based shifting of the wavelength spectra. While we
Pulse50fs vs
Pulse100fs
μ = 0.14488
σ = 0.024081
Pulse50fs vs
Pulse200fs
μ = 0.44987
σ = 0.031077
Hamming Distance
Fig. 7. Intra- and inter-FHD for different input pulses.
Temp300K vs
Temp250K
μ = 0.32696
σ = 0.030786
Si5um vs
Si5umAu60nm
μ = 0.53397
σ = 0.03468
Hamming Distance
Fig. 8. Intra-FHD for different ambient temperatures but for the same peo-
PUF, versus inter-FHD for different peo-PUFs. For the latter, note that the
underlying spectra are provided in Fig. 6.
observe more noise than it was the case for the reproducibil-
ity under input-pulse fluctuations, the intra-FHD distribution
still remains separated from another inter-FHD distribution
(Si5umAu60nm versus Si5um) which was obtained from differ-
ent peo-PUFs. Hence, peo-PUFs can tolerate some temperature
fluctuations, although further compensation measures may
be required in practice, where other noises such as voltage
glitches may play some role as well.
Regarding uniqueness, besides the configurations already
covered in Fig. 7 and 8, we investigated further peo-PUFs. In
Fig. 9, we provide three inter-FHD distributions for exemplary
arrangements of five NPs. The means range from 0.4 to 0.56,
with reasonably low standard deviations of 0.03. The distribu-
tions attest to the potential for strong uniqueness of peo-PUFs.
It should be emphasized again that, in reality, considerably
more than five NPs will be present. Therefore, the inter-FHD
distributions and uniqueness can be expected to improve even
further. The transmission plots as well as one arrangement
of NPs related to Fig. 9 are illustrated in Fig. 10. Note that
most of the NPs were placed in the middle of the SDR (inset
Fig. 10(b)), where the interaction of the propagating photonic
mode with NPs is relatively weak. This interaction can be
largely enhanced through simple manufacturing means, e.g.,
by placing a metallic scatterer inside the SDR, to raise the
uniqueness of peo-PUFs even further.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ensuring the reliability and trustworthiness of electronic
systems has become a pressing concern nowadays. The no-
tion of physically unclonable functions (PUFs) can serve to
implement challenge-response-based authentication schemes
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Si5umAu60nm(5) vs
Si5umTiN60nm(5)
μ = 0.40335
σ = 0.035542
Si5umTiN60nm(5) vs
Si5umTiN(5)
μ = 0.50342
σ = 0.031437
Si5umAu60nm(5) vs
Si5umTiN(5)
μ = 0.56621
σ = 0.03397
Hamming Distance
Fig. 9. Inter-FHD for five NPs. The underlying spectra are provided in Fig. 10.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 10. Transmission plots for different peo-PUF tokens with five NPs.
The red, blue, and green curves correspond to the setups Si5umAu60nm(5),
Si5umTiN60nm(5), and Si5umTiN(5), respectively, as described in Table I. The
inset in (b) shows the spatial arrangement of NPs for Si5umTiN60nm(5), with
NPs labeled as “metal disk.”
or “device fingerprinting,” i.e., device-specific key generation.
While most PUFs have eventually fallen short, especially in
terms of unpredictability, optical PUFs are widely considered
as promising; such PUFs derive their randomness from optical
phenomena, independent of the underlying microelectronics.
In this work, for the first time, we explore the use of
plasmonic NPs toward enhanced optical PUFs, called peo-
PUFs. In general, PUFs have to be unpredictable, unique,
and unclonable, yet reproducible. The core principle of peo-
PUFs—the random depositioning of various NPs on top of a
nonlinear silicon disc resonator—can serve well to achieve all
these requirements. That is because the intertwining of sili-
con photonics and plasmonics by construction enables highly
nonlinear behavior, which is unpredictable, unique, and overly
difficult to clone/reproduce. We have explored that in a first-
of-its-kind, physics-simulation-based study for different peo-
PUF configurations and conditions, thereby also confirming
reproducibility. We have conducted a security analysis of peo-
PUFs in the context of key generation and authentication.
For future work, we plan to manufacture and characterize
peo-PUFs. Toward that end, we also call for relatively simple
optoelectronics, which may allow for fully monolithic inte-
gration of peo-PUFs on silicon chips. Overall, we believe that
the vast range of readily available NPs can open up a unique
opportunity for constructing highly resilient PUFs.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Pappu, B. Recht, J. Taylor, and N. Gershenfeld, “Physical one-way
functions,” Science, vol. 297, no. 5589, pp. 2026–2030, 2002.
[2] R. Maes and I. Verbauwhede, Physically Unclonable Functions: A Study
on the State of the Art and Future Research Directions. Springer, 2010,
pp. 3–37.
[3] C. Herder, M. D. Yu, F. Koushanfar, and S. Devadas, “Physical unclon-
able functions and applications: A tutorial,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 102, no. 8,
pp. 1126–1141, 2014.
[4] C. H. Chang, Y. Zheng, and L. Zhang, “A retrospective and a look
forward: Fifteen years of physical unclonable function advancement,”
Circ. Sys. Mag., vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 32–62, 2017.
[5] F. Ganji, “On the learnability of physically unclonable functions,” Ph.D.
dissertation, Technische Universität Berlin, 2017.
[6] U. Rührmair et al., “PUF modeling attacks on simulated and silicon
data,” Trans. Inf. Forens. Sec., vol. 8, no. 11, pp. 1876–1891, 2013.
[7] Y. Liu, Y. Xie, C. Bao, and A. Srivastava, “A combined optimization-
theoretic and side-channel approach for attacking strong physical un-
clonable functions,” Trans. VLSI Syst., vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 73–81, 2018.
[8] U. Rührmair et al., “Optical PUFs reloaded,” in IACR Crypt. ePrint
Arch., 2013. [Online]. Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/215
[9] P. Tuyls and B. Škoric´, Strong Authentication with Physical Unclonable
Functions. Springer, 2007, pp. 133–148.
[10] B. C. Grubel et al., “Silicon photonic physical unclonable function,”
Opt. Express, vol. 25, no. 11, pp. 12 710–12 721, 2017.
[11] M. Kauranen and A. V. Zayats, “Nonlinear plasmonics,” Photon. Pho-
ton., vol. 6, pp. 737–748, 2012.
[12] U. Rührmair, S. Devadas, and F. Koushanfar, Security Based on Physical
Unclonability and Disorder. Springer, 2012, pp. 65–102.
[13] A. F. Smith and S. E. Skrabalak, “Metal nanomaterials for optical anti-
counterfeit labels,” J. Mater. Chem. C, vol. 5, pp. 3207–3215, 2017.
[14] Y. Zheng et al., “Unclonable plasmonic security labels achieved by
shadow-mask-lithography-assisted self-assembly,” Adv. Mat., vol. 28,
no. 12, pp. 2330–2336, 2016.
[15] A. F. Smith, P. Patton, and S. E. Skrabalak, “Plasmonic nanoparticles as
a physically unclonable function for responsive anti-counterfeit nanofin-
gerprints,” Adv. Funct. Mat., vol. 26, no. 9, pp. 1315–1321, 2016.
[16] K. Park et al., “Plasmonic nanowire-enhanced upconversion lumines-
cence for anticounterfeit devices,” Adv. Funct. Mat., vol. 26, no. 43, pp.
7836–7846, 2016.
[17] Y. Cui, R. S. Hegde, I. Y. Phang, H. K. Lee, and X. Y. Ling,
“Encoding molecular information in plasmonic nanostructures for anti-
counterfeiting applications,” Nanoscale, no. 6, pp. 282–288, 2014.
[18] K. Li and A. C. Foster, “Parametric nonlinear silicon-based photonics,”
Proc. IEEE, vol. 106, no. 12, pp. 2196–2208, 2018.
[19] T. Wang et al., “Multi-photon absorption and third-order nonlinearity in
silicon at mid-infrared wavelengths,” Opt. Express, vol. 21, no. 26, pp.
32 192–32 198, 2013.
[20] J. Gosciniak, F. B. Atar, B. Corbett, and M. Rasras, “Plasmonic Schottky
photodetector with metal stripe embedded into semiconductor and with
a CMOS-compatible titanium nitride,” Nature Scient. Rep., vol. 9, no. 1,
p. 6048, 2019.
[21] J. Gosciniak and M. Rasras, “High field enhancement between trans-
ducer and resonant antenna for application in bit patterned heat-assisted
magnetic recording,” Opt. Express, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 8605–8611, 2019.
[22] A. Kumar et al., “Dielectric-loaded plasmonic waveguide components:
going practical,” Laser Photon. Rev., vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 938–951, 2013.
[23] S. Bozhevolnyi, Plasmonic Nanoguides and Circuits. Pan Stanford,
2009.
[24] W. T. Chen et al., “Manipulation of multidimensional plasmonic spectra
for information storage,” App. Phys. Lett., vol. 98, no. 17, p. 171106,
2011.
[25] F. Wang and Y. R. Shen, “General properties of local plasmons in metal
nanostructures,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 97, no. 20, p. 206806, 2006.
[26] J. A. Schuller, E. S. Barnard, W. Cai, Y. C. Jun, J. S. White, and
M. L. Brongersma, “Plasmonics for extreme light concentration and
manipulation,” Nature Materials, vol. 9, pp. 193–204, 2010.
KNECHTEL et al.: TOWARD PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS FROM PLASMONICS-ENHANCED SILICON DISC RESONATORS 9
[27] J. Gosciniak, J. Justice, U. Khan, M. Modreanu, and B. Corbett, “Study
of high order plasmonic modes on ceramic nanodisks,” Opt. Express,
vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 5244–5254, 2017.
[28] J. A. Scholl, A. L. Koh, and J. A. Dionne, “Quantum plasmon resonances
of individual metallic nanoparticles,” Nature, vol. 483, no. 7390, p. 421,
2012.
[29] H. J. Huang et al., “Plasmonic optical properties of a single gold nano-
rod,” Opt. Express, vol. 15, no. 12, pp. 7132–7139, 2007.
[30] C. Noguez, “Surface plasmons on metal nanoparticles: the influence of
shape and physical environment,” J. Phys. Chem. C, vol. 111, no. 10,
pp. 3806–3819, 2007.
[31] Refractive index database. [Online]. Available: https://refractiveindex.
info
[32] I. Atakhodjaev et al., “Investigation of deep learning attacks on nonlinear
silicon photonic PUFs,” in Proc. Conf. Lasers Elect.-Opt., 2018, p.
FM1G.4.
[33] C. Xiong, D. M. Gill, J. E. Proesel, J. S. Orcutt, W. Haensch, and
W. M. J. Green, “Monolithic 56 Gbs silicon photonic pulse-amplitude
modulation transmitter,” Optica, vol. 3, no. 10, pp. 1060–1065, 2016.
[34] M. Seifried et al., “Monolithically integrated CMOS-compatible III-V
on silicon lasers,” J. Sel. Top. Quant. Electron., vol. 24, no. 6, pp. 1–9,
2018.
[35] H. Guan et al., “Widely-tunable, narrow-linewidth III-V/silicon hybrid
external-cavity laser for coherent communication,” Opt. Express, vol. 26,
no. 7, pp. 7920–7933, 2018.
[36] J. S. Orcutt et al., “Open foundry platform for high-performance
electronic-photonic integration,” Opt. Express, vol. 20, no. 11, pp.
12 222–12 232, 2012.
[37] R. Soref, “The past, present, and future of silicon photonics,” J. Sel.
Topics Quantum Electronics, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 1678–1687, 2006.
[38] B. Chen et al., “Hybrid photon–plasmon coupling and ultrafast control
of nanoantennas on a silicon photonic chip,” Nano Letters, vol. 18, no. 1,
pp. 610–617, 2018.
[39] R. Maes, V. van der Leest, E. van der Sluis, and F. Willems, “Secure
key generation from biased PUFs,” in Proc. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed.
Sys., 2015.
[40] L. E. Bassham et al., “A statistical test suite for random and pseu-
dorandom number generators for cryptographic applications,” National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010.
[41] A. Bojesomo, S. Patnaik, and J. Knechtel. (2019) Security evaluation
framework for peo-PUF. DfX, NYUAD. [Online]. Available: https:
//github.com/DfX-NYUAD/peo-PUF
Johann Knechtel received the M.Sc. in Information Systems Engineering
(Dipl.-Ing.) in 2010 and the Ph.D. in Computer Engineering (Dr.-Ing.) in
2014, both from TU Dresden, Germany. He is currently a Research Associate
at the New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), UAE. Dr. Knechtel was
a Postdoctoral Researcher in 2015–16 at the Masdar Institute of Science and
Technology, Abu Dhabi. From 2010 to 2014, he was a Scholar with the DFG
Graduate School on “Nano- and Biotechnologies for Packaging of Electronic
Systems” and the Institute of Electromechanical and Electronic Design, both
hosted at the TU Dresden. In 2012, he was a Research Assistant with the
Dept. of Computer Science and Engineering, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, China. In 2010, he was a Visiting Research Student with the Dept. of
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Michigan, USA.
His research interests cover VLSI Physical Design Automation, with particular
focus on Emerging Technologies and Hardware Security.
Jacek Gosciniak received the M.Sc. in Applied Physics in 2002 from
Technical University of Lodz, Poland, and the Ph.D. in Functional Materials
and Nanotechnology in 2012 from University of Southern Denmark, Denmark.
He is currently a Research Associate at the New York University Abu Dhabi
(NYUAD), UAE. He has industry experience at Spectra-Physics, Newport
Corp., USA where he spend over one and an half year working as the
Application Lab Engineer. Dr. Gosciniak was a Postdoctoral Researcher in
2012–13 at the Singapore University of Technology and Design, Singapore,
where he was involved in graphene-based plasmonic modulators.
Dr. Gosciniak has extensive experience in working in national and Euro-
pean research projects on plasmonic components and devices, integration of
plasmonics with photonics platform and implementation of plasmonics into
data storage devices like PLASMOCOM, PLATON, COMPASS and ANAP
(national project). Furthermore, his research potential has been recognized by
the EU as he was awarded a Marie Curie Research Fellowship at Tyndall
National Institute, where he has succeeded in bringing together a team
consisting of both industrial (Seagate Technology) and academic partners
(Tyndall National Institute).
Alabi Bojesomo obtained the M.Sc. in Microsystems Engineering from
Masdar Institute of Science and Technology Abu Dhabi in 2016, and a B.Sc.
in Electrical Engineering from Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) Ile-Ife in
2011. He is currently a Research Engineer at the New York University Abu
Dhabi (NYUAD), UAE. His research interests include MEMS and hardware
security.
Satwik Patnaik received B.E. in Electronics and Telecommunications from
the University of Pune, Pune, India and M.Tech. in Computer Science and
Engineering with a specialization in VLSI Design from Indian Institute of
Information Technology and Management, Gwalior, India. He is a Ph.D.
candidate at the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the
Tandon School of Engineering with New York University, Brooklyn, NY,
USA. He is a Global Ph.D. Fellow with New York University Abu Dhabi,
Abu Dhabi, UAE. His current research interests include Hardware Security,
Trust and Reliability issues for CMOS and Emerging Devices with particular
focus on low-power VLSI Design. He is a student member of IEEE and ACM.
Ozgur Sinanoglu is a Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering
at New York University Abu Dhabi. He earned his B.S. degrees, one in
Electrical and Electronics Engineering and one in Computer Engineering, both
from Bogazici University, Turkey in 1999. He obtained his MS and PhD in
Computer Science and Engineering from University of California San Diego
in 2001 and 2004, respectively. He has industry experience at TI, IBM and
Qualcomm, and has been with NYU Abu Dhabi since 2010. During his PhD,
he won the IBM PhD fellowship award twice. He is also the recipient of the
best paper awards at IEEE VLSI Test Symposium 2011 and ACM Conference
on Computer and Communication Security 2013.
Prof. Sinanoglu’s research interests include design-for-test, design-for-
security and design-for-trust for VLSI circuits, where he has more than
180 conference and journal papers, and 20 issued and pending US Patents.
Sinanoglu has given more than a dozen tutorials on hardware security and trust
in leading CAD and test conferences, such as DAC, DATE, ITC, VTS, ETS,
ICCD, ISQED, etc. He is serving as track/topic chair or technical program
committee member in about 15 conferences, and as (guest) associate editor for
IEEE TIFS, IEEE TCAD, ACM JETC, IEEE TETC, Elsevier MEJ, JETTA,
and IET CDT journals.
Prof. Sinanoglu is the director of the Design-for-Excellence Lab at NYU
Abu Dhabi. His recent research in hardware security and trust is being
funded by US National Science Foundation, US Department of Defense,
Semiconductor Research Corporation, Intel Corp and Mubadala Technology.
Mahmoud Rasras is an Associate Professor of the Electrical and Computer
Engineering at New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD). He received a
PhD degree in physics from the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. Dr.
Rasras has more than 11 years of industrial research experience as a Member
of Technical Staff at Bell Labs, Alcatel-Lucent, NJ, USA. Prior to joining
NYUAD. Dr. Rasras was a faculty member and former Director of the
SRC/GF Center-for-Excellence for Integrated Photonics at Masdar Institute
(part of Khalifa University). He authored and co-authored more than 120
journal and conference papers and holds 33 US patents. Dr. Rasras is an
Associate Editor of Optics Express, Guest Editor – MDPI, and a Senior IEEE
Member.
